Non-algebraic convergence proofs for continuous-time fictitious play by Berger, Ulrich
ePubWU Institutional Repository
Ulrich Berger
Non-algebraic convergence proofs for continuous-time fictitious play
Article (Accepted for Publication)
(Refereed)
Original Citation:
Berger, Ulrich (2012) Non-algebraic convergence proofs for continuous-time fictitious play. Dynamic
Games and Applications, 2 (1). pp. 4-17. ISSN 2153-0793
This version is available at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/5591/
Available in ePubWU: June 2017
ePubWU, the institutional repository of the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, is
provided by the University Library and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to the
scholarly output of the WU.
This document is the version accepted for publication and — in case of peer review — incorporates
referee comments.
http://epub.wu.ac.at/
manuscript No.
Non-algebraic convergence proofs for
continuous-time fictitious play
Ulrich Berger?
WU Vienna, Department of Economics
Augasse 2-6, 1090 Vienna, Austria
e-mail: ulrich.berger@wu.ac.at
August 4, 2011
Abstract In this technical note we use insights from the theory of pro-
jective geometry to provide novel and non-algebraic proofs of convergence
of continuous-time fictitious play for a class of games. As a corollary we
obtain a kind of equilibrium selection result, whereby continuous-time fic-
titious play converges to a particular equilibrium contained in a continuum
of equivalent equilibria for symmetric 4×4 zero-sum games.
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1 Introduction
The discrete time fictitious play process is due to Brown (1951) and Robin-
son (1951). Originally this learning process, also called the “Brown-Robinson
Learning Process”, was proposed as an algorithm for calculating the value
of a two-person zero-sum game. Since then it has become a standard learn-
ing process for boundedly rational players. In a fictitious play process each
player believes that his opponent plays a stationary mixed strategy. He es-
timates this mixed strategy by the empirical distribution of pure strategies
his opponent used during the history of the process and then plays a best
response to this estimate.
? I want to thank Josef Hofbauer, Ilias Kastanas, Andrew McLennan, Bill Sand-
holm, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Special thanks go to
Francisco Franchetti for creating Figure 4 using the software Dynamo by Sand-
holm et al. (2011).
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Robinson (1951) proved that under fictitious play the set of Nash equi-
libria is globally attractive for two-person zero-sum games, and Miyasawa
(1961) proved convergence for 2×2-games. For games with more than two
strategies per player convergence need not occur, however. Shapley (1964)
demonstrated this with a 3×3 bimatrix game for which fictitious play ends
up in an asymptotically stable limit cycle.
The cited results also hold for symmetric games, and for the continuous-
time fictitious play process (Rosenmu¨ller, 1971), henceforth CFP, or the best
response dynamics (Matsui, 1992), which differs from this process only by
a rescaling of time (see Hofbauer, 1995, Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer, 1995,
and Monderer and Shapley, 1996). For more recent results on the issue of
convergence and nonconvergence of fictitious play and the best response
dynamics see Berger (2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2008), Hofbauer and Sandholm
(2009), Hahn (2010), and van Strien (2011).
CFP paths are typically the union of line segments in the state space.
The point of this paper is to show how this geometric property can be
exploited to provide new insights into the convergence properties of CFP
paths, based on results from projective geometry. This is intended as a first
starting point, and we want to propose this method as a useful tool for the
further analysis of fictitious play.1
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
fictitious play and the best response dynamics, and defines cyclic play. Sec-
tion 3 reviews the principles of projective geometry and adds two results
which establish the connection to cyclic CFP paths. In Section 4 we present
the main result and add some examples of how to apply this result in well-
known cases. A new result is derived from the main theorem in Section 5,
where we show that CFP ‘selects’ a particular equilibrium from a contin-
uum of equivalent equilibria in symmetric 4×4 zero-sum games. Section 6
concludes. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
2 Fictitious Play
2.1 Notation
Let (A,B) be a two-player bimatrix game where player 1 has pure strategies
numbered from 1 to n, and player 2 has pure strategies 1, . . . ,m. A is an
n×m payoff matrix for player 1 and B an m×n payoff matrix for player 2.
Thus, if player 1 chooses i and player 2 chooses j, the payoff to player 1 is
1 Algebraic properties of projective maps have been used before in proofs of
existence or uniqueness of limit cycles under continuous-time fictitious play, e.g. in
Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer (1995) or in Benaim et al. (2009). The only instance
I’m aware of where a purely geometric (non-algebraic) argument is used in this
context is the first of the two proofs of Lemma 2 in Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer
(1995), which they attribute to their colleague Gerhard Kowol from the University
of Vienna and which inspired the present work.
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aij and the payoff to player 2 is bji. The set of mixed strategies of player 1
is then the n−1 dimensional probability simplex Sn, and analogously Sm is
the set of mixed strategies of player 2. The expected payoff for player 1 using
strategy i if player 2 uses the mixed strategy q ∈ Sm is (Aq)i. Analogously
(Bp)j is the expected payoff for player 2 using strategy j against the mixed
strategy p. If both players use mixed strategies p and q, respectively, the
expected payoffs are p′Aq to player 1 and q′Bp to player 2, where the
prime denotes the transpose of a vector. For p ∈ Sn we denote by BR(p)
the set of best responses to p. A pair of mixed strategies (p∗,q∗) is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if q∗ ∈ BR(p∗) and p∗ ∈ BR(q∗).
For t = 1, 2, 3, . . . , the sequence (p(t),q(t)) is a discrete fictitious play
process, if
(p(1),q(1)) ∈ Sn×Sm
and for all t,
p(t+ 1) =
tp(t) + b1(t)
t+ 1
, and q(t+ 1) =
tq(t) + b2(t)
t+ 1
,
where b1(t) ∈ BR(q(t)) and b2(t) ∈ BR(p(t)).2
2.2 Continuous Fictitious Play and the Best Response Dynamics
If we go from discrete time steps to continuous time t > 0, we obtain the
continuous fictitious play process (CFP)
p˙(t) =
b1(t)− p(t)
t
, q˙(t) =
b2(t)− q(t)
t
.
Up to a rescaling of time - which does not change the shape of the orbits -
CFP is equivalent to the best response dynamics
p˙(t) = b1(t)− p(t), q˙(t) = b2(t)− q(t).
The best response dynamics was introduced by Gilboa and Matsui (1991)
and Matsui (1992). The usual interpretation is based on the population
model of game dynamics. In this interpretation, each player sticks to some
pure strategy, but every now and then a small fraction of players may revise
their strategy and switch to a pure best response to the average mixed
strategy in the opponent population.
Obviously, if some pure strategy i is the unique best response to q(0),
the CFP path p(t) is a straight line, heading for i, as long as this strategy
remains the unique best response3. The sets of states q with BR(q) = {i}
2 Berger (2007a) discusses Brown’s (1951) original formulation of the process,
which deviates from the standard version presented here.
3 More generally, Hofbauer (1995) shows that for any initial condition a piece-
wise linear best response or CFP path can be constructed.
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for different pure strategies i are disjoint, open and convex subsets of Sm. If
at time t1 the best response changes to i′, then the path p(t) suddenly heads
for strategy i′. At the turning point p(t1) the respective payoffs are equal.
The same holds analogously for the path q(t). If (p(t),q(t)) converges to a
point (p∗,q∗) for t→∞, then this point is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
The best response dynamics can be applied to the single population
model of evolutionary game theory, where pairs of players are drawn from
the same population to play a symmetric game. The analogous model for
CFP demands that both players play a symmetric game and use the same
initial move (and hence the same moves throughout the play). To avoid
confusion, we refer to the latter interpretation if we speak of CFP paths in
symmetric games.
2.3 Cyclic Play
Consider a CFP path x(t) which has the property that there is a sequence
of times (t0, t1, t2, . . .), such that for k ≥ 1, BR(x(t)) is a singleton for all
t ∈ (tk−1, tk). The times tk are the times where (at least) one of the players
switches to another best response. We call the (pairs of) mixed strategies
x(tk) the switching-points of the path. Let the pure strategy (pair) b(tk)
be the goal of the CFP path at times t ∈ (tk−1, tk), i.e. for these t let
b(tk) = BR(x(t)). Following Krishna and Sjo¨stro¨m (1998), we define a
cyclic path4 as a path along which the same sequence of best responses is
repeated over and over. Formally, we call a CFP path x(t) cyclic, if there is
a sequence of R ≥ 2 (pairs of) pure strategies b1,b2, . . . ,bR, such that for
k ≥ 1, k mod R = r implies b(tk) = br.
If player 1, say, switches from i1 to i2, then at the switching time t1 he is
indifferent between these two pure strategies - both do equally well (and at
least as good as his other pure strategies) against q(t1). Geometrically, the
set of points q ∈ Sm where player 1 is indifferent between two given pure
strategies i1 and i2, is a linear subspace of Sm. The next switch again occurs
when one of the players is indifferent between two of his pure strategies.
Between switches, the CFP path is a straight line heading for some pair
of pure best responses. The analogous considerations hold for symmetric
games. This implies that all the maps sending some switching-point to the
next switching-point are perspectivities (for an exact definition see below).
The composition of the consecutive perspectivities along a cycle define a
Poincare´ map for the CFP path. Poincare´ maps often turn out to be useful
tools in analyzing the behavior of orbits of continuous dynamical systems.
They reduce the dimension of the state space and simultaneously yield a
discrete dynamical system which is often easier to study5. In order to analyze
4 Rosenmu¨ller (1971) calls it a quasi-periodic path.
5 Due to the discontinuity of the vector field, linearization around an equilibrium
is not possible for CFP, and one must either apply topological tools, as Ljapunov
functions, or, as in this paper, study the properties of a suitable Poincare´ map.
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this Poincare´ map we have to take a closer look at the perspectivities it is
built of. This is the purpose of the next section.
3 Projective Geometry
Consider the Euclidean plane R2. Two distinct and non-parallel lines inter-
sect in exactly one point. If the lines are parallel, however, their intersec-
tion is empty. In projective geometry, this “exception” is defined away by
extending the Euclidean plane in a way which can intuitively be described
as follows: Given a line l in R2, the set consisting of l and all lines parallel
to l is called a pencil of parallel lines. To each pencil of parallel lines we add
an abstract entity P∞ called the point at infinity of the pencil. The lines
of the pencil are said to intersect at P∞. (“Parallels meet at infinity.”) The
set of all points at infinity form the line at infinity. The union of the Eu-
clidean plane and the line at infinity is called the real projective plane and
denoted by Π. In Π two distinct points (one or both of which might be at
infinity) define exactly one line, and two distinct lines (one of which might
be at infinity) meet in exactly one point (which is at infinity in the case of
parallels). This is a standard method in projective geometry as explained
e.g. in Casse (2006), to whom the interested reader is referred to for more
details.6
3.1 Pappus’ Theorem
We introduce the following notation:
For two distinct points A and B in Π we denote the line spanned by
this points by AB, and the intersection of two lines (or, more generally, two
nonempty sets) a and b in Π is denoted by a ∩ b. Three or more lines are
said to be concurrent, if they have one point in common, and three or more
points are said to be collinear, if they all lie on one line. We will now state
an important and well-known theorem which we need later on.
Theorem 1 (Pappus) Let l and l′ be distinct lines in the real projective
plane. Let A,B,C be three distinct points on l and A′, B′, C ′ three distinct
points on l′, all different from l ∩ l′ . Define P := AB′ ∩ A′B, Q := AC ′ ∩
A′C, R := BC ′ ∩B′C . Then P,Q,R are collinear.
Pappus’ theorem is illustrated in Figure 1.
6 This intuitive method can easily be formalized by introducing homogeneous
coordinates, but we refrain from doing so here since we don’t need those for our
definitions and results.
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Fig. 1 Pappus’ theorem.
3.2 Perspectivities in Real Projective n-Space
We constructed the real projective plane by adding to R2 the points at
infinity, forming the line at infinity. Analogously we can construct the real
projective 3-space by adding to R3 the points and lines at infinity, which
build up the plane at infinity. For higher dimensions, the real projective n-
space is constructed in the same way. We write Pn(R) for the real projective
n-space, hence Π = P 2(R).
A subset T of Pn(R) is called a subspace if for any two points A,B ∈ T
also the line AB belongs to T . The subspaces of Pn(R) are simply the
Euclidean subspaces of Rn, extended by the respective elements at infinity.
A k-dimensional subspace is called a k-plane. In the special case k = n− 1
we speak of a hyperplane in Pn(R). It can be shown that a k-plane U and an
m-plane V in general position in Pn(R) have nonempty intersection U ∩ V
if k +m ≥ n, and the intersection is a (k +m − n)-plane. Specifically, the
formula
dim(U ∩ V ) = dimU + dimV − dim(U + V ),
known from the theory of vector spaces, holds, where U + V := {X ∈ Y Z :
Y ∈ U, Z ∈ V } denotes the span of U and V .
We call a set of points in Pn(R) co-k-planar, if the points span a k-
plane. For k = n− 1 we also write co-hyperplanar. Co-1-planar thus means
collinear.
Definition 1 Let H1 and H2 be two distinct hyperplanes in Pn(R). Let pi
be a map from H1 to H2. pi is a perspectivity, if there exists a point Z, not
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on either hyperplane, such that for any X ∈ H1, pi(X) = XZ ∩H2.
Z is called the center of the perspectivity, and H1 ∩ H2 the axis of the
perspectivity.
A perspectivity is bijective and the inverse of this map is also a perspec-
tivity. Note that the axis of pi is an (n − 2)-plane which is pointwise fixed
under pi. The following lemma states a well known result from projective
geometry about the composition of perspectivities.
Lemma 1 The composition pi := pi2◦pi1 of two perspectivities pi1 : H1 → H2
with center Z1 and pi2 : H2 → H3 with center Z2 between pairwise distinct
hyperplanes, where pi1 and pi2 have the same axis H1 ∩ H2 = H2 ∩ H3, is
again a perspectivity. The center of this perspectivity lies on the line Z1Z2.
By induction it follows that the composition of finitely many perspectiv-
ities with the same axis, mapping some hyperplane H1 to some hyperplane
Hm, is a perspectivity, if H1 6= Hm. If Hm = H1, i.e., if the mapping returns
to H1, the ‘return map’ on H1 can thus always be written as the composi-
tion of two perspectivities, viz. Hm ◦ (Hm−1 ◦ · · · ◦ H1). The next section
gives a precise definition of these return maps.
3.3 Perspective Collineations
Definition 2 A perspective collineation σ on a hyperplane H1 is a compo-
sition pi2 ◦ pi1 of two perspectivities pi1 : H1 → H2 and pi2 : H2 → H1 with
centers Z1 and Z2. The axis of σ is the axis L := H1 ∩H2 of pi1 (and pi2).
For Z1 6= Z2, the center of σ is the point Z := Z1Z2 ∩H1.
If Z ∈ L, then σ is called an elation, otherwise it is called a homology.
In the degenerate case where the centers Z1 and Z2 coincide, the per-
spective collineation is the identity on H1. If the perspective collineation σ
is not degenerate, then the center and all the points on the axis are fixed
points of σ, and there are no other fixed points (see Figure 2 for an illus-
tration in the real projective plane). Hence, if σ is an elation, the points on
the axis are the only fixed points. This is important for the study of the
dynamics resulting from iteration of a perspective collineation on a hyper-
plane. In the case of an elation, there are no fixed points apart from those
on the axis. This rules out the existence of periodic orbits of CFP, since the
intersection of a periodic orbit with a hyperplane would be a fixed point
under the respective return map. In the next theorem we provide sufficient
conditions for σ to be an elation.
Theorem 2 In Pn(R) for n ≥ 2 let σ : H1 → H1 be the composition
pik ◦ · · · ◦ pi1 of finitely many perspectivities pi1 : H1 → H2, . . . , pik : Hk →
H1 (k ≥ 3) between hyperplanes Hi with common axis L ⊂ H1 and centers
Z1, . . . , Zk in general position7. If the intersection points F1 := ZkZ1 ∩
7 Points Z1, . . . , Zk in P
n(R) are in general position, if no n + 1 of them are
co-hyperplanar.
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Fig. 2 The axis L and the center Z of a perspective collineation composed of two
perspectivities in P 2(R).
H1, F2 := Z1Z2 ∩H2, . . . , Fk := Zk−1Zk ∩Hk are co-hyperplanar, then σ
is an elation.
Proof See appendix.
To study the stability of fixed points of a perspective collineation, it is most
convenient to return from a projective space to a Euclidean space by remov-
ing the elements at infinity. A perspective collineation induces a map on this
Euclidean space. This map is well defined except on points which map to
points at infinity under the collineation.8 It can be shown that the center of
a homology (if it is not at infinity) is always a hyperbolic fixed point of the
induced map. The center of an elation is of course non-hyperbolic, since it
lies on the pointwise fixed axis. As the next lemma shows, the behavior of
orbits near the center of an elation follows a simple pattern.
Lemma 2 Consider a perspective collineation σ on a hyperplane H1 with
center Z. Let H¯1 be the Euclidean hyperplane constructed by removing the
elements at infinity from H1, and let σ¯ be the return map on H¯1 induced
by σ. If σ is an elation, Z is semistable under iterations of σ¯, i.e., on one
side of the axis, all orbits converge to Z, and on the other side, all orbits
diverge from Z.
Proof See appendix.
8 E.g. in Figure 2, if X is moved to the right along H1 until the line XZ1 is
parallel to H2, then X has no image under the induced map pi1 in Euclidean space
and therefore also σ(X) is no longer defined at this point.
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4 The Main Result
Now we have the necessary instruments to bridge the gap between projective
geometry and CFP. If a CFP path is cyclic, then it defines a Poincare´ or
return map on an indifference hyperplane. Geometrically, the return map is a
composition of perspectivities. In Theorem 2 we have found conditions under
which the return map is an elation, i.e., a perspective collineation whose axis
contains its center. Translating these conditions into properties of a game
reveals that the center is a Nash equilibrium in this case, and applying
Lemma 2 yields the semistability of this equilibrium under the return map.
Since the return map is suitably defined only on one side of the equilibrium,
either all orbits converge to the equilibrium, or all orbits diverge from the
equilibrium. Divergence, however, is ruled out by the observation that the
return map points inwards at the boundary of the mixed strategy space.
Hence the equilibrium attracts all cyclic CFP paths outside the equilibrium
set. This result is made precise by Theorem 3 below. We start by defining
a property of a game that allows us to make use of Theorem 2 and leads us
to the main result.
Definition 3 A symmetric game has the parallel property, if every hyper-
plane of indifference9 between two pure best responses i and j is parallel in
the space of mixed strategies to the line connecting i and j.
A bimatrix game has the parallel property, if every hyperplane of indiffer-
ence of player 1 (player 2) between two pure best responses i and j is parallel
in the space of mixed strategy profiles to the line connecting (i,b) and (j,b)
((b, i) and (b, j)), where b is an arbitrary pure best response of player 2
(player 1).
Remark: Any symmetric zero-sum game A has the parallel property. This
is because the hyperplane of indifference is the set {x ∈ Sn : (ei−ej)′Ax =
0}, and the vector ei − ej is parallel to this hyperplane, since the zero-sum
property of A implies (ei−ej)′A(ei−ej) = 0. Note, that the other direction
is not true. There are symmetric games with the parallel property, which
are not zero-sum. An example will be described in section 4.3.
For bimatrix games (A,B) we note that every bimatrix game has the
parallel property. The reason for this is that the hyperplane of indifference
of player 1 between i and j is the set {(x,y) ∈ Sn×Sm : (ei− ej)′Ay = 0},
which is trivially parallel to the vector (ei,b) − (ej ,b) = (ei − ej ,0), and
the same holds for player 2, independently of i, j,b, and the payoff matrices.
Theorem 3 Let G be a finite two-person game with the parallel property
and a set of completely mixed Nash equilibria with codimension 2. Then
there is a single Nash equilibrium that attracts all cyclic CFP paths.
9 In finite two-person games, because of the linearity of payoffs, the set of points
where a player is indifferent between two given pure strategies is generically the
intersection of this player’s mixed-strategy simplex with a hyperplane. This inter-
section is called the hyperplane of indifference corresponding to the two strategies.
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Proof Fix some hyperplane of indifference H1, where switching occurs for
CFP paths. Any other hyperplane of indifference distinct from H1 cuts H1
into 2 halves. Switching occurs only on one half of H1, the half where the
pure strategies that the player is indifferent between, are best responses.
Any cyclic path crosses this half-hyperplane infinitely often. Define σ as the
return map on this half of H1. The maps sending one switching point to the
next are perspectivities with a common axis, since all the hyperplanes of
indifference intersect in a set L of codimension 2, which is therefore identi-
cal to the set of completely mixed Nash equilibria of the game. The centers
of these perspectivities are (pairs of) pure strategies, and are therefore in
general position. The parallel property of G implies that the lines through
two consecutive (pairs of) best responses intersect the correponding hyper-
planes of indifference at the hyperplane at infinity, hence all these intersec-
tion points are co-hyperplanar. Applying Theorem 2 tells us that σ is an
elation, and by Lemma 2, we conclude that on the half-hyperplane where σ
is defined, either all orbits of the return map converge to its center, or all
orbits diverge from its center. The second possibility is ruled out because
the return map points inwards at the boundary of the space of (pairs of)
mixed strategies. It follows that any cyclic CFP path outside the equilib-
rium set converges to the center of σ, which is a particular Nash equilibrium
of G. uunionsq
4.1 Example 1: Matching Pennies
The well known game of Matching Pennies is the standard representative
of the class of 2×2 bimatrix games with a unique and completely mixed
equilibrium. Any such game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game
(Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). Its cyclic best response structure implies
that every nonconstant CFP path is cyclic (see e.g. Rosenmu¨ller, 1971,
or Metrick and Polak, 1994), as sketched in Figure 3(a). Since the game
of Matching Pennies is zero-sum, convergence to equilibrium follows from
Robinson’s (1951) result. However, it can also be derived from Theorem 3,
since the game has the parallel property and the equilibrium has codimen-
sion 2 (it is a point in a plane).
4.2 Example 2: Rock-Scissors-Paper
The Rock-Scissors-Paper game, short RSP game, is a symmetric two-person
game where each player has pure strategies rock, scissors, and paper, and
the best response structure is cyclic: rock beats scissors, scissors beat pa-
per, and paper beats rock. With payoffs 1, 0, and -1 for win, draw, and loss,
respectively, this game is zero-sum10, and all nonconstant CFP paths are
10 CFP for generalized RSP games is treated in Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer
(1995).
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Fig. 3 CFP paths for a Matching Pennies game (a) and the Rock-Scissors-Paper
game (b).
cyclic (see Figure 3(b)). Again convergence to the completely mixed equi-
librium (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)′ follows, because the game is zero-sum, but is also
implied by Theorem 3, since the RSP game has the parallel property and a
completely mixed equilibrium of codimension 2.
4.3 Example 3: 2×2 Role Games
Given some bimatrix game called the base game, the corresponding role
game is defined as the symmetric game where each player is assigned the role
of player 1 and player 2 with probabilities 1/2 each, and then plays the base
game against the other player. This definition implies a special structure for
the payoffs in the role game. If the base game is of the Matching Pennies type
as in our first example, then it can be shown (see Berger, 2001), that the role
game is a 4×4 game with a line segment of completely mixed equilibria, and
all CFP paths outside this equilibrium line are cyclic. Moreover, this role
game has the parallel property, but in general it is not zero-sum. In Berger
(2001), it is proved that there exists a unique equilibrium that attracts all
CFP paths outside the equilibrium line. There, the attracting equilibrium
is explicitly calculated. However, the mere existence of such an equilibrium
is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.
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5 Symmetric 4×4 Zero-Sum Games
The application of the main theorem to these examples provides new proofs
for known results. Indeed, convergence of CFP for games that are strate-
gically equivalent to zero-sum games (as in the first two examples) is most
conveniently proved by invoking an appropriate Ljapunov function, see Hof-
bauer (1995). If a zero-sum game has an isolated equilibrium, then this
equilibrium is unique. However, for some classes of zero-sum games there
is no isolated equilibrium, but only a continuum of Nash equilibria. For
these cases, Ljapunov’s argument shows convergence of CFP paths to the
set of equilibria, but it does not tell us anything about how the paths ap-
proach this set. It could be the case that any equilibrium attracts some
path, or that only a strict subset of the equilibrium set is attractive. The
first of these alternatives sounds more plausible, since from the viewpoint of
classical, static game theory, there is no way to discriminate among the dif-
ferent equilibria – they are equivalent11 in the sense of van Damme (1983).
However, we will show below, that under CFP, or in a population of best
response players, a particular single equilibrium may emerge in the long run.
For a symmetric game A which is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum
game, we have A = −A′ without loss of generality, and x′Ax = 0 for all x ∈
Sn. If there is a completely mixed equilibrium x∗, then Ax∗ = 0. Therefore
the kernel of A is nontrivial, at least one eigenvalue of A is 0. Since A is
skew-symmetric, its eigenvalues are purely imaginary, appearing in complex
conjugate pairs. The set of completely mixed Nash equilibria is intSn ∩
KerA, the intersection of the interior of Sn with the kernel of A in Rn. The
dimension of this intersection is m− 1, where m is the dimension of KerA,
which equals the multiplicity of the eigenvalue 0. Hence the completely
mixed equilibrium can only be unique, if the eigenvalue 0 has multiplicity
one, what in turn implies that the number n of pure strategies in the game
is odd. If n is even, the multiplicity of the eigenvalue 0 is also even, and the
set of completely mixed equilibria is either empty or a continuum. For n = 2
an interior equilibrium exists only in the degenerate case, where the whole
simplex consists of equilibria. The case n = 3 was subject of our second
example, the RSP game. If a completely mixed equilibrium exists for n = 4,
then it is contained in a continuum L of equilibria in S4. The dimension of
L is either 3 (the degenerate case) or 1.
If the dimension of L is 1, its codimension is 2. Hence Theorem 3 applies
and we can formulate
Proposition 1 For any symmetric 4×4 zero-sum game there exists one
particular equilibrium which attracts all CFP paths outside the equilibrium
set.
11 Two equilibria p and q of a symmetric game A are equivalent, if x′Ap = x′Aq
and p′Ax = q′Ax for any x ∈ Sn.
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Fig. 4 Four CFP paths for a 4×4 zero-sum game with a line segment of Nash
equilibria (black line). All CFP paths converge to the barycenter of the simplex.
Note that this can be read as an equilibrium selection result. Indeed,
CFP (with identical initial move) or the best response dynamics select a
particular equilibrium among a continuum of equivalent equilibria as the
long run outcome.
As an illustration, consider the symmetric zero-sum game
A =

0 −1 0 1
1 0 −1 0
0 1 0 −1
−1 0 1 0
 ,
taken from Sandholm (2010, p. 321). This game has a line segment of Nash
equilibria connecting the states ( 12 , 0,
1
2 , 0) and (0,
1
2 , 0,
1
2 ). Figure 4 shows
the four CFP paths starting at the vertices, all converging to the single
equilibrium ( 14 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ).
6 Summary
We introduced the discrete fictitious play process, continuous-time fictitious
play, and the equivalent best response dynamics. We defined cyclic play and
argued that since CFP paths are typically the union of line segments point-
ing at pure strategies in the state space, the theory of projective geometry
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might provide useful tools for the analysis of convergence of cyclic paths. Af-
ter establishing the necessary results from projective geometry, we defined
the parallel property for games and showed that this property, together with
a Nash equilibrium set of codimension 2 implies the global convergence of
cyclic CFP paths to a particular Nash equilibrium. This main result was
illustrated by three examples, and as a first corollary we presented a new
result which can be interpreted as an equilibrium selection result for sym-
metric 4×4 zero-sum games. Admittedly, this is a rather specific result, but
the present note mainly intends to introduce the techniques of projective
geometry, and we hope that more general convergence or nonconvergence
results can be produced by these methods in the future.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Theorem 2
For the proof of Theorem 2 we use induction with respect to n, the dimension
of the projective space. The induction basis, the case n = 2, is given by the
following lemma, which is proved separately.
Lemma 3 In the real projective plane, let σ : l1 → l1 be the composition
pik ◦· · ·◦pi1 (where k ≥ 3) of finitely many perspectivities between concurrent
lines, i.e., perspectivities pi1 : l1 → l2, . . . , pik : lk → l1 with common axis
L ∈ l1 and centers Z1, . . . , Zk ∈ Π, no three of which are collinear. If the
intersection points F1 := ZkZ1∩ l1, F2 := Z1Z2∩ l2, . . . , Fk := Zk−1Zk∩ lk
are collinear, then σ is an elation.
Proof We prove this lemma by induction with respect to k, first showing
that it holds for k = 3. This case is illustrated in Figure 5. By Lemma 1,
pi2 ◦ pi1 is again a perspectivity with its center Z12 lying on Z1Z2. We can
construct this center in the following way: Let F ′1 be the image of F1 under
pi1, and let F ′′1 be the image of F
′
1 under pi2, then F
′′
1 is also the image of
F1 under pi2 ◦ pi1. Formally
F ′1 := F1Z1 ∩ l2 , F ′′1 := F ′1Z2 ∩ l3 , Z12 = F1F ′′1 ∩ Z1Z2 .
Note that due to the collinearity of Z1, Z2, and F2, we can also see that
Z12 = F1F ′′1 ∩F2Z2. The points F1, F2, F3 are collinear by assumption, and
Z2, F
′′
1 , F
′
1 are collinear by definition of F
′′
1 . Applying Pappus’ theorem to
these six points yields the collinearity of the points
Z12 = F1F ′′1 ∩ F2Z2 , Z3 = F1F ′1 ∩ F3Z2 , L = F2F ′1 ∩ F3F ′′1 .
Hence for the center Z of σ (given by Z := Z12Z3 ∩ l1) considered above we
have Z = L. This proves the case k = 3.
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Fig. 5 The case k = 3 for Lemma 3.
For the induction step we show that the case k = K can be proved if
we assume the lemma holds for 3 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. To this end, we define the
point Z0 := ZKZ1 ∩ Z2Z3. Remember we have perspectivities
pii : li → li+1 with center Zi (i = 1, . . . ,K − 1), and
piK : lK → l1 with center ZK .
Now we introduce the additional perspectivity pi0 : l1 → l3 with center Z0.
Let us have a look at the compositions
p := piK ◦ · · · ◦ pi3 ◦ pi0 : l1 → l1 and q := pi−10 ◦ pi2 ◦ pi1 : l1 → l1 ,
where σ = p◦q = piK◦· · ·◦pi1 is the perspective collineation we are interested
in. p is an instance of k = K − 1 and is an elation by assumption. So we
know that L, the center Z0 of pi0, and C, which shall denote the center
of piK ◦ · · · ◦ pi3, are collinear. The same is true for L, the center Z12 of
pi2 ◦ pi1, and Z0 (which is also the center of pi−10 ), since q is an instance of
k = 3. It follows that L,Z12, C are collinear. Now σ is the composition of
two perspectivities σ = (piK ◦ · · · ◦ pi3) ◦ (pi2 ◦ pi1) =: p¯ ◦ q¯, with
p¯ : l3 → l1 with center C, and q¯ : l1 → l3 with center Z12,
16 Ulrich Berger
L 
X 
 
HF 
H0 
P(HF) A 
P(X) 
P(L) 
Fig. 6 Configuration in the proof of Theorem 2 for n = 3 and k = 4.
where l1 and l3 meet in L, and L,Z12, C are collinear. For the center Z :=
CZ12 ∩ l1 of the perspective collineation σ this collinearity implies Z = L.
Hence, σ is an elation. uunionsq
Now that we have established the induction basis for Theorem 2, as-
sume that the theorem holds for dimension n − 1 and consider the case of
dimension n. For this induction step we introduce a central projection P
in Pn(R) for n ≥ 3: Let HF be the hyperplane spanned by the points Fi
(i = 1, . . . , k). Let A be an arbitrary point in HF ∩ L (this intersection is
nonempty, since its dimension is n−3 ≥ 0), and choose another hyperplane
H0, which does neither contain the center Z of σ, nor A. Now define P by
P : Pn(R)− {A} → H0, P (X) := XA ∩H0 .
P projects the centers Zi and the points Fi in Pn(R) to points P (Zi), P (Fi)
in H0. Since A is contained in the axis L, the image P (L) of the axis is the
intersection of L andH0, which is an (n−3)-plane, while the hyperplanesHi
are mapped to (n−2)-planes P (Hi), intersecting in P (L). Now by construc-
tion of P the hyperplane HF , containing the points Fi and A, is mapped
to an (n − 2)-plane P (HF ), containing the images P (Fi). In Figure 6 the
situation is sketched for n = 3 and k = 4.
This projection thus simply reduces the dimension by one: H0 can be
identified with Pn−1(R), and the corresponding hyperplanes of this pro-
jective space are the images P (Hi) and P (HF ). P induces perspectivities
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piPi : P (Hi)→ P (Hi+1), piPi (X) = P (pii(X)) (these are well defined, since
X ∈ P (Hi) implies X ∈ Hi) with centers P (Zi) and common axis P (L) be-
tween hyperplanes of H0, and the composition of these perspectivities is the
induced perspective collineation σP on P (H1). The axis of σP is P (L), and
its center is P (Z). Certainly σP is an elation if and only if σ is an elation.
In H0 the points P (Fi) are co-hyperplanar, and by induction assumption
σP indeed is an elation. Hence also σ is an elation. uunionsq
7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
For any point X ∈ H1, the three points X, σ(X), and Z are collinear. Hence
iterating σ leaves the line XZ invariant. Let σ′ be the restriction of σ to this
line. The center Z is the only fixed point of σ′. We can identify the line XZ
with R ∪ {±∞}, assuming w.l.o.g. Z = ±∞. Then the restriction of σ′ to
the real line is a continuous function admitting no fixed point. Hence either
σ′(x) < x or σ′(x) > x for all x ∈ R. In both cases all real points move
in the same direction under iterations of σ′. That means, they approach Z
from one side and diverge from Z from the other side. By continuity of the
return map σ¯, all points on one side of the axis converge to Z, and all points
on the other side diverge from Z. uunionsq
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